Warning Out, Then and Now

I

You might know what dispossession feels like if you’ve ever jumped into the Charles River at night. I felt something like that, I think, throughout the year of 2008, when I was living alone. And then again, having come back to my town but seeing nothing there. And then when I left again. September 8th, 2008 the first night I slept at Harvard University, I could have told you that dispossession feels something like black water, like drowning beneath the lights of a city in September, and like feeling totally alone.

I had met a girl named Joyce who was real shy. She said her father was a diplomat so she never stayed in one place for more than a few years and had never had many friends. We walked together from the Yard to the River, the lights of Dunster Street glowing as if very wet and totally yellow, like they do. We stripped off our clothes on the dock – I remember feeling very cold – and danced a little – I spun her – and then we jumped into the water. Whooo ahhh I shouted. Someone else, a boy’s voice from the road beyond the grass, said Yeeeehaaaa. When we got out of the river, we folded on the grass and sat there, in total silence, with the air, light and brilliant – the air was very light that night – mixing with the lights of Boston beyond the river, and me, I remember thinking something like This, this is the day your slumber breaks…She asked me: Are you just going to forget about this? I smiled and she smiled too and I said: Nothing counts, you know – it’s Freshman Week.

That night, I guess, rounded something off for me. It was the first time that I wondered, real hard, whether I hadn’t just walked out the front door, when I could have walked out the back. It was that night, my looking at the city from that place on the banks, thinking about place, to be one thing and not another thing, thinking that I am a small part of something much bigger, more complex and totally indifferent, that I first began to think about homelessness. I can’t say that I know what dispossession feels like today, but I could tell you that night. Tramping back to the Yard in the soaking clothes, I thought Whooo ahhh Yeeehaaaa, what a thing it is to be here.

II

One of the striking things about Harvard Square is the thick, magisterial iron gate that wraps around Massachusetts Avenue, enclosing Harvard Yard.

The other striking thing about Harvard Square is the homelessness. Bowed and veiled figures sleep beneath the threshold of the bookstore, and if you stop to ask why they come they usually say that it is a safe place to sleep and that there is good money, and that the lights never turn off.

To me, the two facts of the iron gate and the homeless population are compelling evidence that if a place can be said to have deliberate design, that if communities are a product of something more than spontaneous individual desire, then the Designer must have a poet’s eye for symbols, or at least a good sense of humor.

Reckoning with homelessness requires that the two, the gated university and the homeless population, be dealt with together. They are too closely aligned, their presence here a juxtaposition too sever to absolve my story of. And me – me too, I am too much a product of my place within this world to pretend that I am something different; if I have any authority at all, it is from that place that I am given, from inside the gate rather than from the street.

The Square at night is something like a carnival. I have seen her in the dawn; she looks half-roused and ice-cold. But at night, she spins, like a lighted wheel, glitters. The lights are bright – air cold – the nights in the Square are entirely nonviolent, very happy. A man plays a saxophone. A chilly day, the lightness of autumn, the bright lights will never go out in the Square – if I look out the window at four in the morning from by bunk bed, as I often have, I will undoubtedly see a person walking through the square, from the Coop through JFK.

How does one find a homeless person? I think to myself.

It’s odd, but perhaps entirely practical, that we go first to the saddest-looking woman. We see across the street a figure sitting, leaning forward on the brick edge of a potted tree. She is in front of the stoop – like a gargoyle, very gray, bundled like a marshmallow with two gray hats. The color scheme of poverty; vibrant colors don’t seem to last; the city is in battle against chromatic vibrancy.

“Hey. I’m Max. This is Pete. How are you doing?”

“How do you do?” She was very quiet, so low that Pete never heard what she had to say. We shook hands.

“We’re from the College. We’re working on a piece about people who live in Harvard Square…”

“I don’t live here.”

“Oh?” I told her that’s OK. We’d treat her to dinner, if she’d be willing to talk a few minutes about her time.

“I don’t live here,” she repeated.

“Where are you from?”

“North Carolina.” One could detect the drawl. That drawl – passport, place-giver, what she still has.

“Do you have a family in North Carolina?”

“Yes.” She spoke quietly, in a whisper. “I’m sorry, but I’m not interested.”

“We’re trying to help. We want to tell people’s stories.”

“All I want to do is go home,” she said.

“How’d you get to Boston? Did you take a train up?”

“I got a ticket. You know how it is. I got a ticket and now I can’t get home. I just want to go back.”

“Hey, are you sure you wouldn’t be interested in having a nice dinner with us and talking a little.”

“Yes. Thank you. I’m not interested.”

“What’s your name?” She looked up. “Oh, uh, don’t worry about that – I’m Max and this is Pete.”

She turned and – thinking back I remember vividly, as you do such things – she winked and smiled.

I said: “If I see you around, I’ll say hi.”

That was the first substantial meeting I had with a homeless person in the square. That night, if it is like most that I spent in the early part of my first semester, I spent talking about Barack Obama with my roommate – we would talk about him for hours on end – and then, other than that, not talk much at all. I would walk from class to class, wave to acquaintances that I passed in the yard. And in the dinning hall, drifting slowly from the conversation, I would look around. A small girl with a fleece squints with a tray in her hand. A blonde boy and blonde girl with freckles talk about going home with over the weekend. “Yeah, it’s restorative. You just feel like that boost will give you something, and you can last until Thanksgiving.” There was one day (I remember it distinctly) looking at this place, all these people, that I realized with embarrassment mostly and a little relief, that I considered myself homeless, and that the gates did not divide nearly as much as I thought. I began this project with the question: how far is the trip from here inside the gate to the outside; how far must one travel before one can sleep on the street. Now I’m not sure. We’re all looking to be connected. I think everyone is trying as hard as they can be not to be invisible.


III

It is the aim of this essay to describe a part of our past that concerns the creation of community and the alienation of citizens.

Harvard Square, as I’ve said, is an odd community to walk through, because walking through it is like being on the inside and the outside at once – it is to walk into the very center of a world society, of which Harvard University is both an agent and an index, and to be with those on the outskirts of that society, the kids in the pit with joints and those panhandling on the side of the street. I think it’s accurate to imagine that in the Square there is an invisible boundary line that swoops around, separating people, cutting the space into pieces, a precipice – like an iron gate – between society and those on the outside.

The act of creating boundaries achieves both inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, I know with whom I belong; I am like all these people, in at least one respect: I am a member of their group. Such communities are defined by the reciprocity that exists between members. I can help this man, because he can help me back. And the need that these communities thrive on is as old as Western society itself: to be thy brothers’ keeper. But such imperatives only go so far; they go as far as the boundary line. A person outside of the community is different from me; I cannot imagine his pain or his needs, because we are of a fundamentally different substance. He is a puzzle to me; he exists beyond the limits of my empathy.

The boundary line absolves the moral imperatives to aid those on the outside, while maintaining it for those on the inside; it reconciles the primordial need for community with the eminently practical, eminently human, need, borne of fear and of reason, to exclude other from that imperative – to not give everything to everyone. The history of American protest movements has been the history of the process of expanding this boundary line; it has been the history of enfranchising different groups into the American community, drawing the line of empathetic obligation to a still greater circumference –foreigners, African Americans, women, gays…

The process of psychological boundary-drawing that occurs in Harvard Square, between the homeless and us has its explicit analogy in history – it is, as we will see, one manifestation of a legal code, which is another manifestation of this process, brought by the earliest settlers from England and observed for at least one hundred and thirty years from the founding until the mid eighteenth century.

One strategy for understanding the present, and I suppose it is a theme, is to understand the past – to explore the attempts and failures we have made in divorcing ourselves from that plot of land we were handed to till. I acknowledge as a writer and a person that I cannot divorce myself entirely from my Self – that I can only explore homelessness from my place. America, as all nations, is just this way – it owes a great deal to the place it was given, like a child that owes a lot to its father. The notion that the settlers broke free from their history is as silly as the notion that any tramp coming to the Square can truly be said to have no past, no place, to be absent of identity-giving context.

We now turn to a look at the manner in which current psychological practices existed in the past as legal institutions, how our forefathers codified the practices of exclusion that Harvard Square, so many years later, portrays in sharp relief.

When the earliest settlers arrived in New England they brought with them the principles of English common law; in particular they brought with them an understanding of the town that is fundamentally different from our understanding of it today. For the English, the town was a collective property owned in part by each inhabitant; it was a private body rather than a public one. As per this status, each inhabitants of a town was responsible for the conduct and support of each other member of the town. Each member now had compulsory obligations to stave off the crime and the poverty of each other, provide bail when their neighbors were in binds and anticipate problems and enact justice – the individual towards the whole, the whole for the individual, each for all and all for each. The town as a unite of economic support. Francis Palgrave in his 1832 Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth, writes that such a custom goes back to the principles of English Teutonic Townships. “The earliest notices respecting Teutonic Townships are to be collective from the laws of Salic Franks. A ‘Villa; was entirely the property of the inhabitants, and no stranger could settle within its boundaries, unless with the consent of the whole incorporation…”

This obligation, termed “frankpledge,” after the Teutonic law, began first as a custom. Neighbors would give money to a family that was victimized by crime, and would then search out the person who perpetrated it. After the Norman invasion, England was organized by feudal divisions, and the obligation was codified. Each town was broken up into units of ten, called tithings, and each was responsible for enforcing justice and welfare of the whole unit. One of the earliest itineration of the arrangement comes from a twelfth-century scribe who said that "It is of this sort, namely that all men in every vill of the whole realm were by custom under obligation to be (debebanf) in the suretyship of ten, so that if one of the ten commit an offence the nine have him to justice."

During the English Civil War and the confusion that followed, local governmental machinery was dismantled, and the church replaced the tithing. The “parish” took up the secular responsibility of maintaining public peace and supporting the poor. In the following years, as the population increased, towns began to increase in size, and local infrastructure was revitalized, roads built and townhouses increasingly put in roles of prominence. In 1601, when the first Poor Laws were written, the town had once again replaced the parish in its original role of providing for the mutual security of its members. The poor, affected by the inchoate symptoms of an increasingly modern England – unemployment, bad harvests, famine, disease, land enclosures, inflation, industrialization, the dissolution of monasteries, the decline of feudal families – those that dwelt on the margins of these processes – were to find relief in their towns, among their neighbors.

These were the legal foundations that the colonists brought to the new world. The town for them was a unit of support. With support, however, comes the complementary and implied right to choose to whom a town is willing to pledge it. The town support structure could not accept anyone indiscriminately, because each new member was an additional legal obligation that might potentially become chargeable to the public good. With this logic, the settlers in the New World enacted laws that strictly regulated citizen mobility. Each town in New England set up statues that defined the “right to inhabitancy,” demanding that prospective members petition for such a right before legal entrance. Towns were to be established by mutual consent, not individual prerogative –
If we here be a corporation, established by free consent, if the place of our co-habitation be our own, then no man hath right to come in to us without our consent
This “right to inhabitancy,” also called “freedom of community,” is the necessary complement to a system of mutual support. This is the necessary two-ness of boundary drawing: that the right to support implies the right to exclude. It is a fact that this asserted right to regulate inhabitancy was exercised in the New England Colonies such as New Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut and Rhode Island for reasons of religious preference, nationality, prestige of the family and economic wellbeing. Regardless of the ultimate reasons for exclusion, it is important that the moral justification was based on the premise of a community of reciprocal aid; for if members are to support each other, they must also be able to consent to the parties that they are going to be supporting.

At first, inhabitancy rights were granted only to those families that the town was prepared to give land to; in time, rights were given to any family that could arrange to buy a plot of land. The Puritans, like their predecessors, regarded land as the basic unit of power, and considered any well-functioning government to be grounded in land ownership. In November, 1634 John Winthrop made a general proclamation that he and the six other chief council of the town should have the right to allocate land to newcomers at their discretion
It is agreed that noe further allotments shalbe graunted unto any new comers, but such as may be likely to be received members of the Congregation: That none shall sell their houses or allotments to any new comers, but with the consent and allowance of those that are appointed Allotters.
In Boston, March 1640 the following was issued, illustrating the connection between land and inhabitancy –
John Palmer, Carpenter, now dwelling here, is to be allowed an Inhabitant, if he can gett an house, or land to sett an house upon (it being not proper to allowe a man an Inhabitant Without habitation)
Town councils made additional restrictions on the flow of visitors. On December 29, 1657, Derman Mahoone was fined twenty shillings for apparently “intertaining two Irish women contrary to an order of the towne, in that case provided and is to quitt his house of them forthwith att his perill” The problem of guests became so bad in Boston that on June 13, 1659 a general proclamation was given:
Whereas sundry inhabitants in this towne have nott so well attended to former orders made for the securing the towne from charge by sojourners, inmates, hyred servants, journeymen, or other persons that come for help in physick or chyrurgery, whereby no little damage hath already, and much more may accrew to the towne. For the prevention whereof Itt is therefore ordered, that whosoever of our inhabitants shall henceforth receive any such persons before named into their howses or employments without liberty granted from the select men, shall pay twenty shillings for the first weeke, and so from weeke to weeke, twenty shillings, so long as they retaine them, and shall beare all the charge that may accrew to the Towne by every such sojourner, journeyman, hired servt., Inmate, &c, received or employed as aforesaid.
In these laws, we see an early American expression of social “pre-destination,” the notion that individuals inherit a place a within a structured social order. This is a very old conception of the world, indeed, dating back to Aristotle, who wrote that society was divided by birth and predisposition between those who are among the ruling class and those who are to be ruled; but the exact nature of pre-destination that the early settlers expressed was less about restricting access to positions in a lateral hierarchy – between the ruled and the ruling – than it was about placing one into a spot, and keeping one there. People were not entitled to move freely from one place to another; they were bound instead to the town that they happen to be born into, or happen to gain admission into.

One important American narrative is the myth of mobility – to move up and to move out, to gain in statured or get up and leave. Early inhabitancy rights expose some of the falsity of the American mobility narrative. They present us with a choice: either stay in the spot of admission or be free to move, not true freedom but the false freedom of homelessness. Early America was based on a permanence of place, and contemporary institutions, Harvard for one, indicate that the conceptual framework for a society based on admission has not been entirely shaken.

The word “hierarchy” here is not entirely appropriate. Puritanism, based as it is on a democratization of the individual’s role in religion, replaced catholic hierarchies, which mirror governmental monarchies, with town meetings and the individual’s relationship with the text. Yet Puritanism called for a different sort of rigidity. Max Weber called “the central dogma” of the puritan faith, the reliance on a society arranged according to the individual’s calling --
The only way of living acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the word
The Puritan religion bound the individual to his “position” in the world. The Calvinists went further, arguing that from this positions one was predestined for to be saved or to be damned – any resistance is ultimately futile, for an individuals fate is inextricably bound up with his origins. This concept of calling is a particularly American one. In Emerson’s famed essay “Self-Reliance” he argued for a radical individualism based ultimately on an acceptance of his unique place within a complex and diverse society. It is often overlooked that this doctrine was not about freedom, but rather about a version of obedience. The individual was bound to his place, and it was from here – and only from here – that can he live as truly fulfilled
Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string. Accept the place the divine providence has found for you, the society of your contemporaries, the connection of events. Great men have always done so, and confided themselves childlike to the genius of their age…
Trusting “thyself” is an act of acquiescence. One must “accept the place [that] divine providence has found for you.” He uses a metaphor about land – in parallel to the land requirements of inhabitancy rights – to make the point
[A man learns] that he must take himself for better, for worse, as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him to till.
Self-reliance, then, is the act of obeying a “Self” that was given from above; it is to take “for better, for worse” the “plot of ground” that one was given. Emerson did not think that this was a dreary prospect. For him, the Self was imperial, it was the source of great wealth and beauty. The individual Self – like the young country that he was writing for – must accept the virgin soil that it had, by the preference of God, been given, if it was to be true to its actions, and grow up in full.
The settlers based their ideals of community on these conceptions of place. The individual was born into a spot in the world, the “calling” in the words of the protestants, the “self” in the words of Emerson, and it was expected that that was where one would remain. The inchoate admission society, based on exclusion and power, which would flourish with the growing prestige of Harvard University and a diversified country with increasing divisions of labor, can be see in Cambridge (then Newtowne) at its very earliest. Here is the writ of admission that John Harvard himself received in 1637 – the first admit to Harvard College, being Harvard himself –
Mr. John Harvard is admitted a Townsman with a promise of such accommodations as wee best Can…

When I said that the colonists did not break from the past, it was meant to illustrate the continuity of laws between England and the Massachusetts Bay Colony. But there is greater significance, in that the laws that they inherited directly pertained to the manner in which people define themselves by the past. One’s past – according to the inhabitancy laws put forth – was the best and strictest way to determine one’s future, for it was only that spot towards which you were necessarily entitled. Accept that place and know your future.


The towns of the Massachusetts Bay not only had the capacity to enforce inhabitancy rights, but were bound to do so by early colonial law. In May 17, 1637, the General Court of the Massachusetts Colony issued the following law –
It is ordered, that no towne or pson shall receive any stranger, resorting hither wth intent to reside in this iurisdiction, nor shall alow any lot or habitation to any, or intertaine any such above three weekes, except such pson shall have alowance vnder the hands of some one of the counsell, or of two other of the magistrates, vpon paine that evry townse shall give or sell any lot or habitation to any such, not so allowed, shall forfet 100s for every offence, & evry pson receive any such, for longer time than is heare expressed, (or then shalbe allowed in some special cases, as before, or in case of intertainement of freidns resporting from some other parts of this country for a concenient time,) shall forfet for evry offence 40s [shillings]; and for evry month after such pson shall there continew 20s; provided, that if any inhabitant shall not consent to the intertainment of any such person, & shall give notice thereof to any of the magistrates wthin one month after, such inhabitant shall bee liable to any part of this penulty
In 1638 the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony wrote that constables
Should informe of newe comers, if any be admitted wthout license; & to that end warrant to bee sent out to the cunstable of each town, to infome the Court of Assistants, wch is to consider of the fines, whether to take them or to mitigate them.
In June, 1650, the colony issued the following. We see in it a characterization of the “wandering poor” as those that had chosen to break the binds of community and the ideals of the “calling” –
Whereas wee are credibly informed that great mischeifes and outrages have binn wrought in other plantacon in America by comanders, and souldjers of seuerall qualitjes, and other straingers issueing out of other parts, vsurping power of gounement ouer them, plundering of their estates, taking vp armes, and making great divisions amongst the inhabitants where they have come, to prevent the like mischiefe in this jurisdiccon, this Court doth order, and it is hereby enacted, that henceforward all straingers, of what qualitje soeuer, above the age of sixteene yeeres, arriving here in any portes or parts of this jurisdicon in any ship or vessel, shall immediately be grought before the Gounor…


These were the statutes of Colonial law, yet they were on the wrong side of history. Throughout the 17th and 18th century, New England’s economy continued to diversify, and the need for labor – artisans, farmers, goods peddlers, clergy, even doctors and lawyers – to flow from one place to another increased. Warfare, such as the King Phillip’s War of 1675-76, an Indian uprising that wreaked havoc on the Massachusetts’s countryside, provided the first instance in America of large-scale homelessness. Pious Bostonians noted in 1675 that “the sin of idleness (whc is the sin of Sodom) doeth greatly increase.” It became practically impossible for towns to enforce laws banning newcomers; and thus, impossible to prevent those that are likely to become chargeable to the town for relief – “the wandering beggars and rogues” – to become taxing on the towns support mechanisms.

With the increase of population and individual mobility as the backdrop, towns passed legislation that allowed them to legally “warn out” newcomers who had entered the town, telling them to leave immediately or else stay without the privilege of public charge. In other words, the towns passed legislation that allowed them legally to exclude those living within the town the benefits of communal support. They enacted legal mechanisms of boundary drawing.
In November, 1692, the following act was passed in Massachusettes, to provide for the legal exclusion of certain people, keeping a record of their name, and using a court for the purpose –
If any person or persons come to sojourn or dwell in any town and be there received an entertained by the space of three months, not having been warned by the constable, or other person whom the selectmen shall appoint for that purpose, to leave the place, and the names of such persons with the time of their abode there and when such warning was given them retunrd into Court of quarter sessions, every such person shall be deemed an inhabitant of such town and the proper charge of the same in case through sickness, lameness, or otherwise, they come to stand in need of relief to be borne by such town. Unless relatives be of suffiencient ability to do so &c.
March 14, 1700 a further act was passed, which recognized warning out, stating that no town shall
be chargeable with the support of any person residing therin who has not been approved as an inhabitant by the town or the selectmen…[unless they had] continued their residence there by the space of twelve months next before and not been warned in manner as the law directs to depart and leave the town, any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding”
These laws were taken seriously, from the early 1600s to the 1700s when warning out provisions were passed until finally, in February 11, 1793, when new settlement rights were drafted for the town of Massachusetts, erasing all provisions for inhabitancy rights and warning out.


Warning out reconciled the Christian imperative towards the beggardly figure who is Christ-like in his humility, with the basic capitalist and Puritan imperative to affirm the importance or work and self-sufficiency. William Perkins, a Calvinist minister at the time, warned fervently against that “wandering beggars and rogues” who were not only a financial plague, but a religious one, who should “bee taken as enemies of this ordinance of God.” The American founding was a dialectic between these two impulses: the Massachusetts Bay Colony established as a religious refuge, and the Jamestown established because of entrepreneurial desire. By warning out a family, a town could continue to fulfill their obligations towards their spiritual brothers, while also respecting the autonomy of the individual who earns his keep and deserves what he receives.

With this came the first class of American untouchables. From the middle of the 18th century to its completion, more than nine thousand people were warned out of Boston, with more than two thousand people in the year 1791-1792 alone. These numbers not only reflect a propensity for warning out, but a need to do so in the first place, a reflection of a class of migrants that had emerged in America, traveling largely from the countryside to the cities in search of labor. When they entered a city and were warned to leave, many of them did. Forty percent of those warned out in Boston in 1780 were not there in 1790. Entire families were legally expelled from towns, left to wander in search of a fixed abode. Such a class has never left us.


One of the first homeless men that I met in Harvard Square was named James. He had biked from Minnesota to Boston, and now lived on the streets of Cambridge. We had invited him to eat lunch with us at Unos, just a block from Harvard Yard. James looks like Charlie Manson, though, as he pointed out: “I don’t have a Nazi tattoo on my forehead and I don’t have blue eyes and anyways Charlie Manson was a total bastard.” James had signs that he wrote on lined notebook paper. He showed them to people who passed by, and sometimes they gave him money. He said that he was doing God’s work – Just Walk Away, said one of the signs. “That’s what the Jews did in Egypt. All you’ve got to do is to walk away.”

We see in the practice of warning out in the towns of New England an early genealogy of distinctly American narratives: the value and utility of work, life on the road, the limits of kindness, the conceptions of community. The first American underclass was not only poor, but literally expelled from a community oftheir peers; whatever aid they received was because of altruism rather than community, founded on a distinction between classes, rather than reciprocity and mutual help. And such a class is still with us, continuing to perpetrate a violence on the myths of our country. The ways that our Christian forefathers elected to categorize people, through the process of inhabitancy rights and warning out, is not entirely distinct from the manners that we attempt to do the same, creating titles (victims, lost souls, deviants, waste products) for the men and women sleeping on the ground tonight, in Harvard Square, outside of the gate this very night.



IV

“Being homeless is not some sort of club.”

“Uh-huh.”

“I went to college in Maryland, dropped out. I became a carpenter and now I don’t have a job, so I sit here during the days. There, that’s my story.”

His voice was very steady, authoritative, commanding – it pierced through, like something very shameful in myself had been exposed.

“Well, you know, I just thought if you’d be interested in talking, then we –” The other man started to grab at my shoulder. He smelled of hard alcohol and his eyes were wild.

“Yeah, I know what you want,” he said, drunk, clearly, with a voice that was high and hard.

“You’re going to write this up in some special school report. I know exactly what you want. Yeah, I know you.”

“Look,” said the man sitting on the ground, with a hat on and the guitar in his lap, “look, I’m sorry, I want to be able to help you out – it’s just I’m tired, you know, some girl came the other day and she was talking with us. You know, I just don’t want to do another one of these interviews.”

“We’re freaks. Yeah, freaks. I’m a vet, you know that.” He put his arm around me. “Wanna go into that store over there, buy me something.”

“I’m not 21.”

“Of course he’s not,” said the steady man on the ground.

“I’m sorry to bother you guys – the point, I guess, was to try not to be, you know, stereotyping, to tell the story very plainly.”

“I’m sorry not to help you with your report,” the man on the ground.

“No – what, don’t be sorry.”

I left feeling great shame in myself, the shame of a voyeur, or a person who had committed something – I would later think – of a great act of dehumanization: I felt like I was treating people as types, the same anger in myself that flows from Baldwin to Stowe. He wrote that she had was dehumanizing by sentimentalizing, that she had turned African Americans into caricatures – and types, no matter how grandiose, can never, after all, be fully human. “The mark of dishonesty, the inability to feel” was how Baldwin wrote of sentimentality.

To step forward into Harvard Square, is to open myself to hearing other people, is to enter a hailstorm of self-reprisal, to question the nature of human interaction and the limits of human empathy. To be at Harvard is to be at the very center of society; to be homeless is to be outside of it. What is the path that one takes to get from here to there?

To put this question of limitations another way: am I going to live my entire life within that small subsection of humanity that I was born into – will I ever be anything but the Self that I was given?

“How does it feel?” Bob Dylan asks. Well maybe to have no home is the opposite of the feeling I get every time I walk to the Square. Every time I see someone I am not, I realize that I am someone. Homelessness lives in that limitation of traversing empathy. It exists in the boundaries between people. It says: I can go anywhere; I can do anything.

Homelessness lives in that limitation of traversing empathy. It exists in the boundaries between people. It says: I can go anywhere; I can do anything.

But is this freedom, the freedom of searching – the search is for somewhere to stop, it is not endless. It is defined by its negative, by the search for the home, the road extending only so far as it must, before you find somewhere called Forever that smiles back.

I went up to my room. A girl was there at my desk doing a problem set with my roommate, and she didn’t even look up when I entered. I sat for a while without saying much and then I went through a blizzard of arguments with my self and my roommate, who could not finish his problem set. The girl, as it were, did not even look up as I spoke.

“There is nothing wrong,” I said. “Simply, nothing wrong with trying to understand people. Yeah, they don’t want to be observed under a microscope. A disorienting disruption of the paradigm,” I said loudly, now, gesticulating. “It’s a class thing, a class hierarchy that is being confused, the collapse of two supposedly autonomous spheres in society. I walk to Pinocchio’s and they sit and beg. We are different – I see that, but I reject the premise, I reject the premise that divisions are autonomous, totally final.

“There is nothing wrong with noticing. That is all. I want to understand people. Certainly our world would be better if we could extend empathy farther, and the 20th century, surely one of the most deadly in history, would be much different if we could walk out to Harvard Square and understand each other a little better.”

A yearning to be a part of a place, to be a citizen again, is, I believe, the ultimate connection between people.


V

In the end, if this period of my life, which I believe in some ways is ending, when I thought a lot about homelessness, and I had pretentious to believe that there was something I could say about dispossession – if it is judged as a failure, then I have to believe it is because I feel like shit about it, because I feel like a failure about it, and because I have been inured to believe that feeling like shit is reciprocally bound with failing, that feelings are twisted together with reality like ribbons in a rope and the rope either pulls you over the side of the boat or that slips through your fingers and lets you slap down to the water.

I don’t know much about the relationship between feelings and reality, but I think that it is a key to my place in this community. For a lot of people, life is a hell of a lot harder than it is for me, and they manage to feel pretty good. Some of the people I met in the course of doing this project had the whole world conditioning their own self-loathing, and they barely showed it at all. Where does the feeling of shame exist? And love? Is it in God? is it in our hearts? is it outside, floating in the streets? does it dwell on the lips of girls? I don’t know much about the answer to that, either. But I think – I’d like to think – that feelings exist as a collective. That every feeling exists as some big force between people, that we take when we need it, that we all share, a big bowl above us, from which we all eat, existing in the sky…

Let’s just for a moment, for the sake of those more-destitute people, think of the feelings rather than the fact, and accept that all the virtues of the latter rest ultimately on the existence of the former. That a man cries and that he wishes to act, and the way that the world is refracted within the prism, is due to his having feelings, and let us just accept that fact.

If this period of my life was a failure it was because I am too cowardly and not nearly creative enough, and because my heart is too small, and, ultimately, because I couldn’t feel enough. I feel like shit about it, but that alone does not mean I have failed. In fact, that’s the only success I’ve had in four months since I jumped into the Charles. I feel ashamed – good, piercing, shame.








Works Cited

Benton, Josiah H. Warning Out in New England. Boston: W. B. Clarke company, 1911.
Boston (Mass.). Registry Dept, and Boston . Record Commissioners. "Records Relating to the Early History of Boston." (a).
---. "Records Relating to the Early History of Boston." (b).
Bridenbaugh, Carl. Cities in the Wilderness : The First Century of Urban Life in America, 1625-1742. New York: Knopf, 1960.
Coser, Lewis A. Men of Ideas : A Sociologist's View. New York: Free Press, 1965.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Essays. Vol. 3. Boston, New York: Houghton, Mifflin and company : the Riverside press, Cambridge, 1904.
Kulikoff, Allan. "The Progress of Inequality in Revolutionary Boston." The William and Mary Quarterly 28.3 (1971): 375-412.
Massachusetts, Nathaniel Bradstreet Shurtleff, and Massachusetts. General Court. Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England. New York: AMS Press, 1968.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. "The Founding of Harvard College." (1995).
Morris, William Alfred. The Frankpledge System. Vol. 14. New York: Longmans, Green, and co., 1910.
Palgrave, Francis. The Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth. : Anglo-Saxon Period. Containing the Anglo-Saxon Policy, and the Institutions Arising Out of Laws and Usages which Prevailed before the Conquest. London: J. Murray, 1832.
Weber, Max, and Stephen Kalberg. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism with Other Writings on the Rise of the West. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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Their own version of existence under the crushing weight of mass.

In his novel Herzog, Saul Bellow creates a character more complex than the one I see, late at night, looking at myself.

This is to say a number of things – Not least, a certain narcissism on the part of this writer; but we can leave that for later. To say that Saul Bellow creates a character, is to note first that he is writer of a certain kind, of an older tradition that believes in literature as exploration of the self, or better, as exploration of the human soul. People in Bellow´s novels are not ideas, wielded like surgical tools (as in the thesis novel of Camus or Sartre), or figures to be pushed through the elegant twists of narrative (like the action novels of Hemingway). It is to say that Bellow is a novelist who believes in character. Also, it is to say that Bellow's characters, many-dimensional, rich, complex, enigmas – that they are just like us.

Thus, we begin with a vision of what it means to be human: freed from type. Freed from the predictable. Too diverse for ideology, too beautiful to be any one thing. Humans are not photographs, constituted of one moment, but portraits, layered with time. Montainge remarked that man is ondoyant et divers – wavelike and varying. To this end, when a Peruvian friends asked me the other day at the dinner table, “Estás triste?” I responded, “No. Yo Soy humano.”

This understanding of character and of humans is not evidently true. It is an expression of self-understanding, which came about in the 17th century, with the growth of city life and a shift in literature.1 What is modern about this vision is only that it is now a subject of discussion. Character and what it means to be human are no longer entirely synchronous.

“The novel of characters belongs entirely to the past.” Saul Bellow, in his Nobel address, quotes Alain Robbe-Grillet as stating. “It describes a period: that which marked the apogee of the individual.” Any account of the artistic enterprise in the past decades says a similar thing. We live in an age more modest, they say, as we no longer believe in the unlimited preciousness of the individual spirit; but also more ambitious. We can look beyond what is human, only human. To conduct a discussion like this, tracing the history of "the self " in literature – this is to dance with shadows in a dark land. But it must be noted, however briefly, that the very existence of a book entitled Loss of Self in Modern Literature is indicative of our times. Something has changed. What would Doestovesky have thought, I wonder, of a literature divorced from the human?

This is not a stodgy point or a pedantic one, mainly because books are not written in a vacuum. If one is to believe these critics when they talk about the decline of the self in literature, then one must also believe that a similar phenomenon coterminously is occuring with how we perceive ourselves. T.S. Eliot said that “the progress of an artist is a continual sef-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality” and Joyce that “personality...finally refines iself out of existence, impersonalizes itself, so to speak.” What does this indicate about the role of the individual consciousness in the modern world?

· · ·

To this question, Moses Herzog, Bellow´s protagonist, might begin, “Dewey tells us that mankind distrust its own nature and tries to find stability beyond or above, in religion or philosophy.” Then: “Come to the point. But what was the point?...Let the enemies of life stand down.”

Herzog is a well-regarded but failing professor; he is a failed but loving father; and – the axis on which the book turns – he has suddenly become a failed husband. His wife left him for his best friend. Herzog, amidst this royal screwing, finds that his academic thoughts provide no answers to cure him of rage, weakness, defeat. Much like the novel (which has almost no action) Herzog is set adrift within a relentless, vital, nervous stream of voices, theorems, clarifications, explanations. “There is too much of everything,” Bellow says in The Adventures of Augie March “...too much culture to keep track of, too many details, too much example, too much influence, too many guys who tell you to be as they are, and all this hugeness, abundance, turbulence, Niagara Falls torrent."

It is from this this mass of everything, that Bellow begins his exploration of character.

The book of has been criticized as solipsisitc. (Saul Bellow after all is a man of magisterial arrogance.) This is true, but it is also just the point. The novel´s narcissism and self-infatuation, its rage, its pity, is because Herzog is not just a book with character, but also a book of character; its purpose is as much to use humans, as it is to understand humans, the modern self and how it exists within an increasingly universal age. Herzog, that bundle of contradictions and jarring self-divisions, filled with marvelous qualities, vaguely comprehended, is a character, free from definition, set in a world equally labyrinthine and contradictory. But Herzog is also trying to understand character. Sitting at his desk, with his letters, Herzog is reading Herzog.

Bellow is not just a returning to a more humane literature. He is, with exploration of character, making a statement about how to survive as a human within a modern mass, filled with a nervous stream of voices, too many voices and too much indiscriminate authority.

· · ·

Herzog has read all the books; he has lived throughout Europe, Chicago “clumsy, stinking, tender, Chicago,” New York; he has rode on the subways, with their “subterranean roar of engines, voices, and feet in the galleries with lights like drops of yellow brother...” Herzog has confronted the mass. “You – you yourself are a child of this mass and a brother to all the rest” he says to himself. To continue the duties of living, you find a place within this

...what it means to be a man. In a city. In a century. In transition. In a mass. Transformed by science. Under organized power. Subject to tremendous controls. In a condition caused by mechanization. After the late failure of radical hopes. In a society that was no community and devalued the person. Owing to the multiplied power of numbers which made the self negligible. Which spent military billions against foreign enemies but would not pay for order at home. Which permitted savagery and barbarism in its own great cities. At the same time, the pressure of human millions who have discovered what concerted efforts and thoughts can do …

We live in what must be considered a universal age. In 17thcentury this concentration began, when feudalism declined and cities formed. Cultural historians tell us that all the complex pycho-historical developments resulting from the shift to cities – the emergence of the individual self, for example (the genre of autobiography began at this time) and the large-scale liberation of the mind from the “idiocy of village life” (Marx´s term) – all this can be summed by saying that “society,” as we understand it now, first appeared, simply because men were forced unto themselves, in great number, for the first time, seen, heard, smelled.

A society of the mass (a universal age) is now forming, as accumulation continues today, with no end in sight. We are lavishly poured together. Blogs, YouTube videos, city squares with throbbing crowds, libraries with too many books. Billions of collected insights from people I have never met, from places I will never travel. We all feel it. There is the prospect that our technology might indeed sum-total and index all human knowledge Ten millions genes have been identified, catalogued into a database. Craig Venter says that number will be doubled by the end of the year.

None of this is news to anyone. People, of course, have no obligation to be philosophers, and few read philosophy. But this collected mass can be felt in the air. Uncertainty, nihilism, massacre, cubism, democracy, emancipation, etiquette, analysis – these, once our highest ideas, are now everywhere, sensed atmospherically, like a foggy cloud floating among us.

In the January 7th copy of Newsweek (of all places) the article “The New New Thing: Same as it Ever Was” tells us: “A wrinkle or two, sure, but another major breakthrough now seems unthinkable: every possibility has already been thought of, and acted upon.” We are an old society, with too many ideas.

Many have been lifted from the idiocy of village life, that is true; and we thank our forces of accumulation. But many, like this Herzog, are lost within the mass. Suffocated. Frightened and confused. Even Newsweek tells us that there is too many, too much and nothing new can come about. How might I keep up the burden of self-hood despite the excess of everything. Who I am among this mass? Where does a feeble voices fit, among this group, these thinkers, possessors of every wisdom, alive and dead, among this great authority, indiscriminate, teeming, swollen, vast. I am completely lost.

This is Saul Bellow´s modernity: the man within the mass. It is this condition that accounts for the excesses of Bellow´s engorged prose; it is this condition responsible for the anxiety, floating like a cloud in Seize the Day, that grips, ravagely, the heart of Herzog.

We see this in his letters. Letters he sends first to family, the newspaper, the government, then to the personal dead and finally to the famous dead: to Heidegger (“Dear Doktor Professor...I should like to know what you mean by the expression ´the fall into the quotidian.´ When did this fall occur? Where were we standing when it happened”), to city officials (“The size of the rats in Panama City, when I passed through, truly astonished me...My suggestion is that you put birth-control chemicals in the baits”) and finally, to God (How my mind has struggled to make coherent sense. I have not been too good at it.). Philip Roth wrote in his introduction, that in this book of a thousand delights, none is greater than these letters. This is true, they are delightful; but there is also something pitiful about it all: a grown man desperate to make sense, to explain, to clarify – but most of all, a man, like a small child, needing to be heard. He wants to be noticed, by someone, by anyone. He is lost within this mass. “As if anyone cared what he was doing here. As if it affected the fate of the world in any way.”

There is vanity to this feeling, of course -- How I must be special. It is to understand that particular bitterness of the modern man, the knowledge that he is not a genius. “Three thousand million human beings exist, each with some possessions, each a microcosmos, each infinitely precious, each with a peculiar treasure” – each telling Herzog that his own uniqueness is bunk. But if this is vain, then it is a human vanity. It is the fear that the individual is lost within an infinite greatness. We hear in Pascal´s remark that “the eternal silence of this infinite space frightens me,” feel it looking at the night stars; it is that fear which brings us to religion, or to cry, alone.

T.S. Eliot said, ninety years ago, that “The existing order is complete before the new work arrives.” The artist has to break into this order; art is a process of supervention; to murder and to create, they necessarily come together. This brings up the question of how to continue being a human – and what it means to be human – despite the mass. This is not, Herzog tells us, in our universal age, a question for only the artist.


· · ·

If Bellow´s novel does not give us an answer, then at the least, it hints at a solution: You´ve got to survive. You human, rich, complex -- you´ve got to continue being.

There is a story that is relevent. Saul Bellow tells of a doctor who wrote a letter to Freud. The doctor writes that he lost his nerve for professional medicine when he saw the body of a beautiful young woman on a dissecting table. Freud responds, saying that “of course” what the doctor had seen was his mother, lying there on the operating table.

To Bellow, this is intellectual fascism, directly offensive to a vision of character as freed from the predictable. Baudelairian, Nietzschean, Marxian, Psychoanalytic, etcetera, etcetera – these are the masterminds whose plans push the individual into the fixity of an idea. Grab onto a truth, no matter how limited, or how cold. Accept, for truth, the grand systems of a mastermind, coming down on the spirit like a butterfly net.

Bellow´s question to Freud is: “Was it not possible to experience beauty or pity without thinking of your mother?”

In an interview, Bellow said that Herzog is a man who “comes to realize that what he considered his intellectual ´privilege´ has proved to be another form of bondage...He needs to dismiss a great mass of irrelevancy and nonsense in order to survive” Before we accept authorities, with their love of apocalypse; before we accept the Ramonas in our lives, telling us to “renew the spirit through the flesh (a precious vessel in which the spirit rested), we must simply be human. Before we accept the Sandor Himmelstein that tells us that facts are nasty and

you must sacrifice your poor, squawking, niggardly individuality – which may be nothing anyway (from an analytic viewpoint) but a persist infantile megalomania, or (from a Marxian point of view) a stinking little bourgeois property – to historical necessity. And to truth. And trth is true only as it brings down more disgrace and dreariness upon human beings, so that if it shows anything except evil it is illusion, and not truth.

Before we accept any of this higher eduction, we must first live. “Your extremists must survive...your immoralists also eat meat.”

Herzog has not succeeded as a professor and it important that he has failed, because Bellow´s point is that ideas must fail. We are too limber and too rich to be pushed into any one thought. Trying to clarify the streaming and mildly audible voices in the human mass, can never be done, sufficiently exact. One must accept ambiguity: the luxary of bewilderment is the central claim of character in a novel, and of a human freed from predictability.

“We love apocalypse too much...Excuse me, no, I´ve had all the monstrosity I want...No more of that for me – no, no! I am simply a human being.”

Accepting the inexact, the ambiguous, the richness of simply a human being is what allow us to survive in the mass, to cut out the irrelevancy, to enjoy simpler, more durable human goods. Hundred of letters later, Herzog lies in the hammock besides the Locust trees on his property. The sky has a blue intensity, he notices. The birds are loud. He has nothing more to say.




1. Before the period of Shakespeare and later of Montainge, the prevailing theory was that personality was the product of chemicals which ran though in the veins called humors: black choler, yellow choler, phlegm and blood. An overabundance of one or the other resulted in the melancholic person, the phlegmatic, the choleric or the sanguine. ↑

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The Human Connection in For Whom the Bell Tolls

There is something mildly perverse about love at first sight. In one glance, the whole of human experience must be felt. In one glance, the lovers must see parts of themselves unfulfilled, fragments of their future that must be righted, bits of their world that need to be completed. First-sight love – extolled by poets as an emotional apotheosis, denounced by cynics as rubbish, idealized by teenage girls with bubblegum mouths and cordless phones as an expectation – depends, in this way, on the utter destruction of time. It depends on life lived in the instantaneity of “now.” Robert Jordan, the hero of For Whom the Bell Tolls by Ernest Hemmingway, saw the young Maria at his guerrillero camp over a pot of stew and immediately felt “a thickness in his throat” (22). Their love jammed the cogs of time into a standstill, allowing Roberto the Inglés and Maria the Rabbit, like the first-sight lovers and their furtive glance, to live the entirely of their lives in the few hours of togetherness they had. Their passionate love scenes chart this gradual cessation of time, reinforcing Hemingway’s belief that the most intense reality is of the singular moments when man feels a brotherhood with the entirety of the human race.

Robert Jordan is a dislocated journeyer. Fighting as a Republican in the Spanish Civil War, he witnesses collective atrocities against humankind, nonpartisan and nondiscriminant. “A Spaniard was only really loyal to his village in the end” and Jordan “never felt like a foreigner” (135) in Spain. Like the Spaniards, he was fighting a war not of ideals or hopes or dreams or fears, but of villages, man against man, boy against boy. He questions the moral foundation of his actions and realizes it does not exist. “What were his politics then? He had none now, he told himself.” Instead, unhinged from moral righteousness, he is left with nothing but the mechanical march of duty. “You’re a bridge-blower now. Not a thinker” (17). Without any meaning to call his own, Robert Jordan, at first, sees the transition between his life and his death as nothing but patriotic decoration,

“And you have no fear?”

“Not to die,” he said truly.

“But other fears?”

“Only of not doing my duty as I should” (91)

Ordered to blow up a bridge despite staggering odds and questionable necessity, Jordan shows a martyr’s willingness to the fulfillment of a task doomed for failure.

However, in the wake of this disillusionment, with the loss of purpose and the encroachment of cynicism, Jordan finds a love, deep and sincere, that salvages his hope and redeems his idealism. Maria gives him reason to fight. The burning strength of this human connection manifests itself throughout the course of three days in four passion-filled love-makings.

The fundamental assumption of time is that that it progresses steadily and forever. Like Jordan’s blind march towards fulfillment of duty, life hollowed of any meaning travels unwavingly towards death. Life dies a little with each passing second. However, Jordan’s love of Maria disrupts this assumption, knocking life off its morbid course of gradual, disgusting decay. Their love questions the progression of time. In the carnal repeat-rhythms of love-making, Jordan can surpass physical reality, hanging on “to nowhere, dark, never any end to nowhere” staying “all times always to unknowing nowhere.” At the height of sexual satisfaction, “up, up, up and into nowhere, suddenly, scaldingly, holdingly all time having stopped,” they feel, “the earth move out and away from under them” (159) and their surroundings dissolve away. The passion of their love telescopes inward the meaning of time, suspending – if only momentarily – the systematic, tick-tocking advancement of the world’s clocks and the dreary nock-on-wood existence of anything around them. This allows them to enjoy each other instantly for an entire eternity. “There was no such thing as a shortness of time” (164). Gazing at his watch with Maria by his side, Jordan found “he could almost check its motion with his concentration.” The hand on his wristwatch moved “slowly, almost imperceptibly” and “he held Maria close now to slow it” (378). Because circumstances – like shattering love – bring fulfillment, and not time itself, “It is possible to live as full a life in seventy hours as in seventy years” (166) and to enjoy the whole of the world in only one moment: “You have it now and that is all your whole life is; now…There is only now and if now is only two days, then two days is your life and everything in it will be in proportion” (169). To Robert Jordan, life can be lived untethered from time, for reality only exists in the instant and no truth is beyond the moment.

This transcendence of linearity reinforces Hemmingway’s cosmic perspectives about a world enjoyed through the senses. Sexual fulfillment is an intensely temporal experience: the feeling of the other’s skins, the fragrances of her hair, the movements of her body. It is about experiencing physical pleasure in the world of the present, not intellectual postulation in the world of the future. Life is to be felt and enjoyed, not abstractly speculated. Robert Jordan avoids the “luxury of going into the unreality” (342) because life is to be experience in the now. Life is in the “tongue-numbing, brain warming” cup of absinthe that brings one back to “all the old evenings in cafés” (51). Life is in the beauty of the “the curve of her throat” and the “fluttering of lashes of the eyes tight closed against the sun” that “all his life he would remember” (159). Life is in the rabbit stew cooked by Rafael the useless gypsy, in the smell of crushed heather and the touch of loved one: “He held her feeling she was all of life and it was true” (264). Life is not meant to be skewered and dissected; it is meant to be enjoyed in the perpetual now of the lover’s embrace.

Sexual embracement – needed for the survival of the species and the regeneration of the individual – thus, is ultimately universal, and, lying on nature’s simultaneous birthplace and cemetery, the forest floor, Robert and Maria unite with all species of all time when they make love. “Now in the night he lay and waited for the girl to come to him…The trunks of the pines projected from the snow that covered all the ground, and he lay in the robe feeling the suppleness of the bed under him” (258). Their union with each other embodies their union with the world. When Jordan holds Maria, he is coalescing mankind’s natural heritage and inevitable destination with its current reality. He is embracing Mother Nature manifest, Maria, whose skin is “tawny as wheat” (158), breasts “like two small hills that rise out of the long plain” (341) and hair “rippling” like “a grain field in the winds on a hillside” (23). Like the Spanish countryside that was pillaged by planes that “move like mechanized doom” (87), Maria’s body too was traumatically violated. However, like the redemption of Jordan and the salvation of the beautiful serenity of natural Spain, if Maria is “loved” then “it would take [the destruction] away” (73).

Love is a force of salvation, a catharsis for the wronged Maria and an awakening for the hollowed Robert Jordan. In their love, they unite two disparate bodies under the fundamental commonness of humanity. They unite under the forces of brotherhood. As Anselmo, the old, wise guerrilla fighter waits in the snow, the reader can hear the fascist soldiers too waiting cold in the snow. Anselmo remarks “The fascists are warm…and they are comfortable, and tomorrow night we will kill them” (192). Political distinctions – fascist, communist, Republican, anarchist – are spurious categorization of humanity because they undermine the fundamental sameness of all people. Robert Jordan’s enemies are neither gods nor beasts, they are humans, beautiful, sensitive and flawed. “How could the Inglés say that the shooting of a man is like the shooting of an animal?...[T]o shoot a man gives a feeling as though one had struck one’s own brother” (442). This human connection is achieved gloriously and idealistically in the spiritual connection of Maria and Robert Jordan. Maria remarks, “Afterwards we will be as one animal of the forest and be so close that neither one can tell that one of us is one and not the other. Can you not feel my heart be your heart?” (262). Likewise, Robert reminds her, “‘I am with thee…I am with thee now. We are both there.’” When Jordan sacrifices himself for the safety of his hillside brethren, he is really sacrificing himself for the safety of all mankind everywhere; When Maria unites with Robert Jordan, she is uniting with all mankind everywhere.

Conversely, cowardice is not the individual’s abandonment of himself (“‘It is not cowardly to know what is foolish’” (54) says Pablo), it is the individual’s abandonment of his brother. Of Finito, Pilar’s past bullfighter lover, she remarked, “Never have I seen a man with more fear before the bullfight and never have seen a man with less fear in the ring” (185). Bravery is not lack of fear; it is a solemn willingness to conquer fear and to defeat the wild, savage bulls within. After the second night with Maria, Robert Jordan waked and felt the “long light body” of Maria “comforting against him, abolishing loneliness against him, magically, by a simple touching of flanks, of shoulder and of feet, making an alliance against death with him” (264). They need not fear death, because they are spiritually bound to protect each other with the depth and intensity that they would protect themselves: Robert “kissed her once” and then “pulled the pistol lanyard up and put the pistol on his side where he could reach it handily” (264).

The novel begins with Robert Jordan lying “flat on the brown, pine-needled floor of the forest” (1) and it ends with his “heart beating against the pine needle floor of the forest” (471). At the beginning of the novel, Jordan is united with nature. At the end, the same is true, but his heart, beating against the soft needle-strewn ground, is awoken. Born cold and calculating, he spent “all [his] life” in the three days on the hill eating rabbit stew, with Anselmo as his “oldest friend” and Maria as his “true love” and “wife” (381) and he dies with a heart, wild and alive.

Robert Jordan, fulfilled and purposive in his final hours, at the height of sexual experience, realizes that he will live always in the instant of Maria’s love, “They were having now and before and now, and above all now, there is no other now, but thou now and now is thy prophet. Now and forever now” (379). As he waits to die on the pine-strewn forest floor he finds solace in the life he lived that day in the darkness from dusk to dawn, a string of singular, eternal moments. He is “completely integrated” (471) and never alone, always alive, and forever united with the whole of mankind.

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Concept of the "Home" in Beloved by Toni Morrison


How does it feel
To be without a home
Like a complete unknown
Like a rolling stone?

- Bob Dylan

Feminists have discussed the concept of the home as the earliest school of social justice, a place where people foment their egalitarian values. Communitarians, on the other hand, have envisaged the home as the realm of personal solace where people equip themselves with the skills to belong as prosperous members of a society. Both understandings emphasize the role of the home as a repository for the hopes and dreams and fears of its inhabitants. The home is less a physical edifice than it is a spiritual one. It is constructed not with wood and tools and concrete, but with the sum of the emotional strength of its indwellers; it is not a geographical location, but a “space” for the mind and body to gather strength, rest and formulate strategy. In this way, “home” is not a utopian or dystopian “destination,” but a very literal extension of the self – a personal history that catalogues the triumphs and follies and hate and love of the past. Without a home, one is stranded without a past, and – with no history – without an identity.

Unlike the thousands of immigrants who have traveled to America to forge for themselves a new home, imported Africans were forced into America as property. They were stripped from a livable past and shackled into a foreign, unlivable future. The story of the American slave is thus the story of the African’s search for a home in a hateful land. In Toni Morrison’s Beloved, each generation hopes to find a better home despite a malignant world: Sethe’s mother traveled from the slave ship to the plantation, Sethe from the plantation to Cincinnati, Beloved from Cincinnati to death, and Denver from a strange, haunted land of ghosts and despair to her community at large. To Morrison, the various “spaces” of the Sethe’s life constitute a broader understanding of her “self.” Each of the three understandings of what a home might be, as developed in Beloved – the Sweet Home plantation, the Clearing and 124 Bluestone Cincinnati – fails because it prevents the dynamic interaction of all the elements of life: one’s spaces of interaction, one’s past, present and hopeful future. Through the concept of the home, Morrison shows that if we estrange one element of our lives, then we have estranged our identity from ourselves.

Life is not a state, but a process. Beloved’s role in Morrison’s book, as a manifestation of a slave history and a personal history, underscores the fluidity of life: she transitions from a corporal child, to a ghost child and then to a resurrected spirit. The narrative structure of the book, too, emphasizes the seamless transitions each character must make to create a life: mentally hurdling from present, to a scarring past and then to a prospective future. Morrison concludes, at a fundamental level, that lives are not sustainable in isolation from these elements: past, present and future.

The home, likewise, is not self-sufficient. It depends on the lively interface between all the “spaces” of one’s existence – the past, present, the future, but also race, violence, trauma, the surrounding community, and love. Just as the characters and narrative transition from one state to another, the homes in Beloved too phase-shift. And these shifts happen with moments of apocalypse. When Sethe kills her own child, she destroys the open, boisterous role 124 Bluestone played in facilitating the interaction between all the elements of her life. The walls of the house literally stymie her interaction with the community, and thus metaphorically serve as boundary between her and her diverse, multifarious life. Three models of the home were developed in Beloved: the Sweet Home slave plantation, the Clearing and 124 Bluestone.

§ Sweet Home. The devastation wrought by slavery is the destruction of the human identity. As a slave, Paul D was stripped of his manhood: the Schoolteacher put a bit in his mouth, preventing him from engaging in the most human process of spoken word. The chickens on the farm retained more identity than he did, with a bit in his mouth, domesticated and emasculated, “‘Mister [the chicken], he looked so…free. Better than me. Stronger, tougher” (72). Sweet Home – whose name rings with dark irony – serves to demonstrate the impossibility of creating a home within institutionalized slavery. The home concept is the intersection of one’s life with one’s identity. Without an identity, slaves cannot have a home. When Sethe asked the dying Mrs. Garner what the word “characteristics” mean she answered, “A characteristic is a feature. A thing that’s natural to a thing” (195). Sweet Home robbed slaves of their identities because it shifted the process of determining what is “natural” from the individual to the institution. It destroyed the dynamic of discovering oneself. Schoolteacher imposes a definition of self onto Sethe: “‘No, no. That’s not the way. I told you to put her human characteristics on the left; her animal ones on the right’” (191). When the students abused Sethe they alternatively defined her as an animal – “And they took my milk” (17) – and an object of human sexuality. Her identity was theirs to determine.

These insidious tendencies of Schoolteacher’s “hard” slavery were latent in Mr. Garner’s “soft” slavery; for all slavery robs the man of the his home because all slavery dynamics destroy his identity, making him a stranger to his past and future and outside community. Halle said about slavery that “It don’t matter Sethe. What they say is the same. Loud or Soft” (195). Sethe tried to “love the work she did, to take the ugly out of it” (22), but ultimately she could not create a home because she could not own her surroundings in a meaningful sense. Though they were treated with a level of kindness under Garner’s authority, the slaves were entirely unable to design their own future or community: “One step off that ground and [the slaves] were trespassers among the human race” (125). Morrison’s point about the interconnectedness of the home – interweaving all elements of one’s life – is violated by an institution that depends on the systematic isolation of the individual from his “self” and from others. “Clever, but schoolteacher beat him anyways to show him that definitions belong to the definers – not the defined” (190). On a plantation, the human identity is up for grab; and the home is sold to the highest bidder.

§ The Clearing. For Sethe, the most important freedom enjoyed in the world beyond Sweet Home was that “you could love anything you choose – not to need permission for desire” (162). In the Clearing, described as a “wide-open place cut deep in the woods nobody knew for what at the end of a path known only to the deer,” (87) Baby Suggs, full of vigor and emotional strength, taught the black residents to exercise their freedom to love what they chose. She preached to them, first and most importantly, to love themselves. “‘[I]n this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet in the grass. Love it. Love it hard…Love your hands! Love them. Raise them up and kiss them” (88). In the Clearing, the ex-slaves were told to renounce their past in order to salvage their futures: “She did not tell them to clean up their lives or to go and sin no more…She told them that the only grace the could have was the grace they could imagine.” Because, “if they could not see it, they could not have it” (88). This is the message of owning the future, and of owning the self. If the plantation functioned as a machine to erode the slave’s identity, the Clearing functioned to erect once more that identity.

However, the Clearing failed because it did not account for the world “yonder”; it isolated the individual within his own heart, denying him the interconnected world he lived within. Because of this, when Sethe visits to contemplate her newfound life with the mysterious girl and Paul D, she is blinded by her own future, and so caught up with herself that she mistakes the strangling hands of Beloved for the healing hands of Baby Suggs: “Sethe was actually more surprised than frightened to find that she was being strangled” (96). If Sweet Home estranges the individual from himself, then Clearing estranges the individual within himself. Its message is narcissistic. The townspeople begin to resent it: “Where does she get it all, Baby Suggs, holy? Why is she and hers always the center of things?” (137). Baby Suggs too realizes that imagining love alone cannot create it. “Baby Suggs, holy, believed she had lied. There was no grace – imaginary or real – and no sunlit dance in the Clearing could change that” (89).

§ 124 Bluestone Road. Unlike Sweet Home and the Clearing, the present home of Sethe, 124 Bluestone Road, changes dynamically, and is personified at various points in the book as “spiteful” (3), “loud” (169) and “quiet” (239). The shifting state of the home underlines the shifting emotional identities of its inhabitants. At first, for twenty eight days after she first moved there, 124 played a lively, boisterous role in the community. In the “cheerful, buzzing house” Baby Suggs, holy, had “loved, cautioned, fed, chastised and soothed.” It was a place to relay messages from one person to another, “for whoever needed them was sure to stop in one day soon” (87). Then, however, ironically, the openness of the home became what allowed the Four Horsemen of the past to stomp so ruthlessly through the yard gate and into Sethe’s life. It was at that moment of claiming her ultimate freedom, when she professed her love for her child with a jagged handsaw, that she elected to end the future of her child and that 124 became haunted by the specter of the past. At the definitive, apocalyptic moment when the slave catchers arrived, the spaces of Sethe’s life intersected: the repression of Sweet Home with the freedom of the Clearing. Those two homes – one that forced her to renounce her identity and other that forced her to be absorbed by it – collided, and she choose to kill both of them, with one fitful stroke of her arms, and blood everywhere.

Because of this decision – to kill the other spaces that constitute her self – Sethe’s home was hurled out of time. She no longer lived in the chronology of past, present and future. Instead, she became trapped in the visitation and revisitation of the deeds of her past. She chose to murder the two homes she knew, closing 124, literally and metaphorically, from the lively interaction of many elements of the life so vital for survival. Literally, the house gate, as a boundary between the community and the individual, that once was “always latching and unlatching in the time when 124 was busy as a way station” was “smashed” leaving “124 desolate and exposed at the very hour when everybody stopped dropping by” (163). Metaphorically, she became dominated – haunted – by her past, and the autonomous ghost that tyrannized her surroundings. When Paul D arrived, he tried to destroy the past in order to salvage the home: “[H]e bashed it about, wrecking everything, screaming back at the screaming house” (18). But then the haunt returned as corporal existence that, like a parasite, ultimately destroyed Sethe’s spirit.

They say that no word is spoken in America outside the context of race, that as a nation, we shall never be liberated from the tragedy of our slavery past. In the words of Baby Suggs, “[n]ot a house in the country ain’t packed to its rafters with some dead Negro’s grief” (5). Just as a nation inherits as a part of its character the entirety of its history, a home too exists as an embodiment of the whole of its emotional and spiritual past. Morrison believes that the home can only exist as nexus between all the aspects of an individual’s life: his past, his emotional fortitude, and his hopes. In the Clearing, the ex-slaves heard a version of themselves very different than the one constructed by their white overlords. However, submerging their past into oblivion does not in-and-of-itself liberate the slave from oppression. Instead, he – as we all – must synthesize his past with present, and all the trauma and violence and love and tears associated, before he can forge a future. When Denver walks out of 124, she carries with her the entirety of her past as she faces her future unknown, hopeful and fearful and different.

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The Picture of Dorian Gray and Wilde’s Aesthetic Philosophy

First published in an 1890 addition of the literary journal Lippincott’s Magazine, The Picture of Dorian Gray, Oscar Wilde’s only full-length novel, was received with a furor of unrest and disapproval. The book seemed to confirm the public’s most sordid suspicions of Wilde’s notorious dandyism: its blistering paradoxes, blithe praises of selfish hedonism and its homoerotic undercurrents all appeared just too immoral to a Victorian age still stuffy and self-righteous. However, rather than bemoan the disapprobation, Wilde accepted it as but verification of the book’s overriding theme; the disapproval confirmed for him his fundamental distaste of the naïve society he inhabited, an age prone to discuss beauty in terms of morality, as good or wicked, godly or satanic. Perhaps disgusted by the simpletons who could not read beyond the story’s clinquant prose and scandalous epigrams, Wilde added to the second book-addition of the novel a preface noting that “There is no such thing as a moral or immoral book.”

However, more than a rebuff to critics, the assertions that books have no moral undercurrents and that “all art is quite useless” can be accepted as a lens through which to understand Wilde’s aesthetic philosophy about the role of the artist in society. He believed that art was intended to be nothing but abstract and imaginative – not a means for life or death or guidance. Characterizing how his work had been at the onset of the novel, Basil Hallward, the tragic painter who worshiped the beauty of a fallen man, captured Wilde’s concepts of aesthetic beauty, “And it had all been what art should be – unconscious, ideal, and remote” (119). Importantly, before he had become entranced by, captive to, the beauty of the novel’s protagonist, Dorian Gray, Basil had created art from within himself, made only to be beautiful. In his portrait of Dorian, Basil betrays Oscar Wilde’s belief that there is no morality in beauty and that art is to “conceal the artist.” Thus, borne out of idolatry, the portrait, changing to the tune of its model’s decaying soul, functions to explore the consequences of an aesthetic philosophy about the uselessness of art that is violated by both its painter and model.

On the surface, the function of the portrait is simpler, intended to be but a spectacle of allegory. Its role, at first glance, is to play out and revisit some of the most staid themes of western literature. For one, it takes center stage in the eerie fable of a man who has made a “deal with devil” to sell his soul for triviality, the prospect of staying forever young. Lord Henry, Dorian’s quick-witted, irreverent confidant, tells him upon meeting, “Yes, Mr. Gray, the gods have been good to you. But what the gods give they quickly take away” (39). Dorian resolves that “Youth is the only thing worth having,” and that if it were he “who was to be always young, and the picture that was to grow old” he “would give everything!” (43). Dorian’s cry is answered. He remains forever youthful, while his portrait grows decrepit and old as an expression of his decaying soul. He sold his consciousness, now embodied in the changing portrait, for the vanity of youth. Wilde, in this way, characterizes youthful beauty as a juxtaposition of both good and evil: the gods grant it but only the devil can maintain it. Youth is a democratic concept, for all individuals to have and for all time to be dying: “Every month as it wanes brings you nearer to something dreadful” (39). The only way to maintain it is to replace the mind – the consciousness – for the body. The painting, at first hollow, becomes filled with Dorian’s spirit, and Dorian becomes but a beautiful shell of a man, like a finely brushed canvass, never changing.

After the deal is made, the portrait functions to exhibit (as artwork is characteristically intended, “to exhibit”) the subsequent allegories of the novel: “the fall from grace” of the once-chimerical, now stained and ruined Dorian, the “doppelganger paradigm” of a man’s saint-like appearance animated, paralyzed by his dark, sordid spirit manifest, and finally, the “youth entrapment,” like Grimm’s Hans and Gretel, of an older man (Lord Henry) intent on killing the innocent (Dorian Gray), in this case, with devilish ideas of immorality and excess.

Nevertheless, Oscar Wilde intended his novel to be much more than a fable; in his preface, he says that “those who go beneath the surface do so at their peril,” daring his reader to take up the challenge. Beneath the surface, the function of the portrait – the picture of Dorian gray – can be seen as highly serious meditation the role of the artist in society. As a commentary on the obligations of a painter, the circumstances of the portrait’s creation can be seen to foreshadow the circumstances of its destruction. Basil Hallward, at the beginning of the novel, understands Wilde’s conception of the artist’s obligation. Hallward echoes Wilde’s assertion in the preface that “To reveal art and conceal the artist is art’s aim” with his statement that “An artist should create beautiful things, but should put nothing of his own life into them” (29). Aesthetics, to Wilde and Hallward, are intended for the simple enjoyment of an “abstract sense of beauty” (29).

However, when Basil Hallward meets Dorian, he violates this understanding of art. Rather than merely as beautiful (for Wilde tells the reader that “those who find beautiful meanings in beautiful things are cultivated”), Hallward sees Dorian as a divine embodiment of “an entirely new manner in art, an entirely new mode of style” (27). His presence no longer inspires art, but is art itself. Basil remarks that “Some subtle influence passed from him to me” allowing him, for the first time, so see “the wonder I had always looked for and always missed” (28). Basil becomes enchanted – utterly dominated – by Dorian’s aesthetic beauty, which he sees as an artistic apotheosis that he cannot escape. Basil does not reveal art, but the art – Dorian – reveals Basil, exposing his soul for the world to see. “I really can't exhibit [the portrait]. I have put too much of myself into it” (20). The portrait, at its birth, thus represents the obscured line between art and reality, where beauty has an inescapable influence, constructing the artist rather than the artist constructing the beauty.

If Dorian is the incarnation of this “new mode of style” whereby reality is art and art is morality, then his corruption represents the failure of this ideal. And the putrefaction of the man in the painting serves to belie the moral worth that Basil ascribed to this new understanding of painting that “without intending” exposes all the “artistic idolatry” (28) of beauty.

The portrait therefore functions to represent the first consequence of Wilde aesthetic philosophy: that art cannot be life. The novel confuses the boundaries of life and art. Dorian, like a piece of artwork, never ages, always remaining beautiful and hollow. The portrait, contrastingly, becomes like life and must suffer from the gyrating, ostentatious decay of Dorian’s soul: “The picture, changed or unchanged, would be to him the visible emblem of conscience” (106-7). In this way, very literally, the portrait aids in protagonist’s tragic confusion of life and art. The portrait becomes his life and his life becomes superficial artwork. Lord Henry tells Dorian, “I love acting. It is so much more real than life” (95). Dorian heads this message, that art is more real than life. In his preface, Wilde states that “it is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirror.” Sibyl Vane, Dorian’s first love, understands this dichotomy. When she finds love, an emotion that burns in her more real than any stage scene, she realizes that “art is but a reflection,” (101) kaleidoscopic and superficial, rather than a reality, and she no longer needs to pretend. Dorian, on the other hand, is convinced that art and life are but two words for the same thing, “How little you can know of love, if you say it mars your art! What are you without your art?” (102). Wilde believes that the cardinal sin is using art to live one’s life; Dorian relishes in the sensation of this sin: “to him life itself was the first, the greatest, of the arts, and for it all the other arts seemed to be but a preparation” (143).

Fundamental to Wilde’s aesthetic philosophies is the prospect of a new Hedonism, expounded throughout the novel by Lord Henry, who fancied Dorian as its “visible symbol” (24). Henry’s doctrine depends, more than anything else, on the intense processes of self-realization. It depends on the individual thinking of nothing but himself and his identity. Henry tells Dorian that “The aim of life is self-development. To realize one's nature perfectly – that is what each of us is here for” (34). To do this, we need to never relent in pursuing pleasure, “One could never pay too high a price for any sensation” (73). This process of self-realization depends on an entire disregard for others: neither charity nor reaching out, only an attention to the “highest of all duties, the duty that one owes to one's self” (34). In his essay The Critic as Artist, Wilde expressed these views as his own, that

They miss their aim, too, these philanthropists and sentimentalists of our day, who are always chattering to one about one's duty to one's neighbor. For the development of the race depends on the development of the individual, and where self-culture has ceased to be the ideal, the intellectual standard is instantly lowered, and, often, ultimately lost.

 

The aggrandizement of the individual is at the heart of the new Hedonism. The realization of this ideal requires that the individual renounce all external forces of guidance. “There is no such thing as a good influence” Henry tells Dorian, for to influence someone is “to give him one's own soul” so that it becomes but “an echo of someone else's music.” Henry sums up Wilde’s broad, subterranean theme: “To be good is to be in harmony with one's self” (93).

Lord Henry’s philosophy, like Wilde’s, was of a process of intense self-discovery through pleasure. Dorian, however, wildly perverts these intentions. Rather than treating aesthetics as a means for gratifying and shaping his identity, he slays his identity to gratify his pleasure. “[Pleasure’s] aim, indeed, was to be experience itself, and not the fruits of experience, sweet or bitter as they might be” (144). He becomes a hollow shell ruled over by the prospect of base satisfaction. Rather, as Lord Henry subversively suggests, than using pleasure for his own purposes, he allows pleasure to use him, systematically degrading his consciousness. “There are moments, psychologists tell us, when the passion for sin, or what the world calls sin, so dominates a nature that every fibre of the body, every cell of the brain, seems to be instinct with fearful impulses.” At these times, the body is ruled over by its sensation: “Men and women at such moments lose the freedom of their will. They move as automatons move. Choice is taken from them” (201). The New Hedonist is a master of his own desires. Dorian is a slave to them.

Thus, another function of the portrait is to illustrate the second, perhaps more fundamental, consequence of Wilde’s aesthetic philosophy: that art is self-realization, absent of external influence. Basil Wallward is destroyed his worship of physical beauty, and the portrait embodies his definitive start towards downfall. Dorian tells him, “You met me, flattered me, and taught me to be vain of my good looks” (169). Basil is killed by the vanity he inspired in with his deification of Dorian’s beauty. Of this control Dorian had over his identity, Basil remarks to Lord Henry “‘I did not want any external influence in my life. You know yourself, Harry, how independent I am by nature. I have always been my own master; had at least always been so, till I met Dorian Gray’” (24). Basil died because he worshiped external beauty, failing to attend to his own precious selfhood.

Dorian’s identity too, most profoundly, is a constellation of external influence. For one, he is a product of Lord Henry, who found, “something terribly enthralling in the exercise of influence” because it lets one “hear one's own intellectual views echoed back to one with all the added music of passion and youth” (52). Also, he product of the lush book that spins a tale of a “Parisian who spent all his life trying to realize…all the passions and modes of thought that belonged to every century except his own” (139) whose “influence” Dorian “could not free himself from,” (141) whose story, indeed, alludes to his own life story, of a man trapped young who can think all the thoughts of the world and experience all the sensations of the world, except his own. Finally, Dorian is a product, perhaps most stultifyingly, of “the still more poisonous influences that came from his own temperament…the mere physical admiration of beauty that is born of the senses” (133). He is a product of his own unquenched urges for carnal sensation and pleasure. He lives his life a slave to his appetite: “The more he knew, the more he desired to know. He had mad hungers that grew more ravenous as he fed them” (143). The portrait thus emphasizes that his soul, quite literally, is trapped outside of his body, subject to external control. Imprisoned by the force of its presence, its influence, Dorian knew that only through with the portrait’s death could Dorian’s self live once more. By stabbing the painting, he knew he could stab at the chains that shackled him and “[the knife] would kill the past, and when that was dead, he would be free” (234). However, it was too late to salvage his identity, and he died, as he stabbed the painting, decrepit and hollow from sin.

Oscar Wilde wrote in the first stanza of his 1881 poem Helas!: “To drift with every passion till my soul / Is a stringed lute on which all winds can play, / Is it for this that I have given away / Mine ancient wisdom, and austere control?” With his novel, Wilde examined, for the world, this haunting question. Dorian, tragically, was willing to forgo his “ancient wisdom” so that he could “drift” with the whims of his passions. He was willing to sacrifice his “austere control” over his identity on the altar of an aesthetic art he worshiped, that, like a god force, ultimately enslaved him. The portrait thus functions as a cautionary tale to a world too willing to give up itself at the prospect of the beautiful, whatever form that may be: the morally good, the sinfully bad, the righteous, the wicked – to Wilde, these are not from “art” external and imaginative, these are from oneself. Art really is quite useless.

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